publication date: Aug 8, 2012
|
author/source: Adam Parachin
Charities face a strange
contradiction surrounding the role they are permitted to play in the law and
policy making processes of government. Charities are in many senses uniquely
suited for active, constructive participation in the process of law and policy
reform. A combination of field experience, specialized knowledge and closeness
to the community gives them the capacity to comment meaningfully on the effectiveness
of existing and/or the need for new government programming.
Nevertheless, the doctrine of
political purposes severely restricts the ability of charities to function as
agents of reform. Charities are permitted to expend only a restricted amount of
their resources on political activities. The permitted amount ranges from 10%
to 20%, depending upon the charity's annual income (the lower the annual
income, the higher the permissible percentage). Partisan participation in
election campaigns is, however, absolutely prohibited. Further, no institution
can qualify for charitable status (or continue to so qualify) if it has (or
adopts) a political
purpose, as
distinct from a political
activity.
Recent developments
Critics of the doctrine of
political purposes welcomed the 2010 decision of the
Australian High Court in
Aid/Watch
Inc. v. Commissioner of Taxation. Bucking the trend of the Canadian and
English precedents, a majority of the High Court concluded that agitating for
legal or policy reform is an acceptable way for a charity to achieve its
charitable mission. In other words, swaying public opinion on law and
government policy is not automatically a political activity permitted on an
exceptional basis but can instead qualify as the charitable mission of an
organization.
The
Aid/Watch decision sparked hope that Canadian courts might follow
suit and liberalize the rules restricting political advocacy by charities.
However, such hope was quickly squelched by the 2011 decision of the
Federal Court of Appeal in
News to You Canada v. Minister of National
Revenue. In this decision the Federal Court of Appeal expressly concluded
that
Aid/Watch should not be followed
by Canadian courts.
More recently, the federal
government signalled its policy preference for strengthened rather than relaxed
rules regulating the political activities of charities. In addition to
introducing new tax penalties for charities carrying on excessive political
activities, the 2012 Budget introduced new rules designed to frustrate the use
of inter-charity grants to fund the political activities of charities. Under
the new rules, a charity funding political activities carried on by another
charity will itself be considered to be engaging in political activities to the
extent of the funding provided. Further, Canadian charities receiving funding
from foreign sources to carry on political activities must now for the first
time disclose the receipt of such funding to the
Canada Revenue Agency.
How are charitable and
political purposes distinguished?
With the renewed emphasis on
regulating political advocacy by charities it is important to revisit both how
and why the law distinguishes between charity and politics.
Courts have categorized as
political the promotion of a political party or candidate for public office. Since
electioneering is perhaps the quintessential political act, this is neither
surprising nor controversial. Indeed, anecdotal accounts suggest that there is
absent any widespread pent-up desire on the part of Canadian charities to
become actively and directly engaged in electoral politics.
What is less satisfactory is that
courts have also characterized as political any purpose that entails seeking a
change of any sort - even unquestionably altruistic changes - to the law or
policy of a domestic or foreign government, promoting a point of view or
attitude of mind, advocating in favour of one side of a controversial social
issue and creating a climate of opinion. It is here where the doctrine of
political purposes has arguably been unduly broad in its categorization of
political purposes.
A few examples readily illustrate
the controversy. In
McGovern v. Attorney General, the
House of Lords concluded that the
Amnesty International Trust, a Nobel Peace Prize winner, was not
charitable because one of its purposes was to seek the abolition of human
torture. The Court reasoned that abolishing human torture could only be
accomplished by seeking a change to the law (how else could torture be truly
"abolished"?). But since seeking a change to the law is political, seeking the
abolition of torture must by necessary implication also be political, or so the
Court reasoned.
In another widely criticized
decision -
Re Strakosch - it was held
that a trust established for the purpose of appeasing racial tension was political
rather than charitable. One of the concerns raised by the Court was that
appeasing racial tension could very well extend to seeking law reform and more
generally promoting an attitude of mind through support of, say, a particular
newspaper or political party.
Re
Strakosch is admittedly no longer administratively enforced by the
Charities Directorate of the Canada Revenue Agency but it reveals the
unexpected breadth of the doctrine of political purposes.
Contradictions abound
Through the doctrine of political
purposes, courts have managed to sustain seemingly contradictory positions
surrounding the legal meaning of charity. So although it is political to seek
the abolition of human torture, courts have nevertheless established that it is
charitable to prevent cruelty to animals. It is charitable to educate the
public towards the view that peace is preferable to war, but political to help
two societies find peaceful ways to live together. It is charitable to educate
from a particular point of view, but political to promote the same point of view.
It is political to pursue law reform of any sort, but organizations pursuing
law reform through constitutional human rights litigation have nevertheless
been registered as charities. Appealing to emotions is political, but purposes
inciting strong emotions can qualify as charitable.
The list of apparent
contradictions supported by the doctrine of political purposes could continue. Nonetheless,
the federal government endorsed the doctrine in the 2012 Budget and by
extension the somewhat strange implications it bodes for the legal meaning of
charity. For better or for worse the doctrine will remain good law in this
jurisdiction for the foreseeable future.
With the Federal government's
crackdown on political advocacy by charities comes a renewed need to understand
the policy basis for the doctrine of political purposes. These rationales will be explored in a
follow-up article. We shall see that the
rationales in support of the doctrine are as unusual as the doctrine itself.
Adam Parachin is associate professor at the Faculty of Law at the University of Western Ontario. He
teaches, researches and writes in the areas of trusts, estates and charities
law. His work in the area of charities law has recently been recognized through
the Douglas J. Sherbaniuk Distinguished Writing Award from the Canadian Tax
Foundation and a substantial research grant from the Social Sciences and Humanities
Research Council to study donation incentives.
Contact him at 519-661-2111, ext 81445 or by email.